

point. I had observed that the many Athenian vase scenes of Athena with Herakles in a chariot proceeding to (or arriving in Olympus) explain for us the point of the episode.⁴ Cook alludes to Warren Moon's argument that the chariot scenes in Athenian art may antedate it. This is possible, indeed likely, since familiarity with such scenes would have guaranteed the ordinary Athenian's recognition of what was implied by the procession. Chariot epiphanies of pairs of deities were long established in Greek art and the Athena/Herakles team was a speciality of Athens. That such scenes were far more popular much later in the sixth century is irrelevant to their existence at and probably before the time of the Phye episode, and their faltering survival in the repertory after the tyranny is a product of vase-painters' conservatism, since they disappear no less slowly than several other Herakles scenes. Moon worried about the impiety of the impersonation, but if the episode happened at all (as I believe it did) it was in a society where the impersonation of deities by mortals in acts of cult and cult-related drama or choral presentation, sometimes of a less than dignified character, was acceptable, and we do not know how far the impersonation by Peisistratos might have gone—probably there was none physically.⁵

Other issues and objects are irrelevant to the main argument though they are important talking-points and pose questions that need answering: such as the Oxford vase with Athena as *Herakleous kore*, or the scene alleged (by others) to show Peisistratos' return after Pallene (which I find improbable): Cook, 168–9 refers.⁶ It is sad that we have to rely so much on the vases. I see no need to look on them for any 'political intent' or any possibility that they were the medium for any deliberate political propaganda,⁷ though some may have been bespoken with a purpose. They mirrored, through their own conventions, views of myth expressed more explicitly in literature, song or narration, inspired by the needs of society, its leaders and its cults. That Greeks

used their myth-history as a mirror to their life, and one which they could readily distort to suit their needs and circumstances, is a commonplace.

What started as an observation of a remarkable parallel between history and art (the Phye story) was fed by knowledge that the phenomenon was a wholly acceptable one for Greeks of the succeeding period and in tune with their treatment of myth from as early as we can discern it, and fattened by a series of further observations about history, cult and art in sixth-century Athens which required explanation, and for which explanation was not readily forthcoming in any other way. Any detail or group of details may be interpreted differently, and disquiet with one aspect cannot amount to a serious discrediting of the whole. Cook has explored all or most of the aspects, with differing emphasis and conclusions. But I expect that he will agree with much that I have said. Taken as a whole the Herakles phenomenon in sixth-century Athens seems inexplicable in any other terms, and for me these remain probabilities until some equally comprehensive and more compelling explanation is offered.

JOHN BOARDMAN

Lincoln College, Oxford

The Wisdom of Lucian's Tiresias

The climactic moment of Lucian's *Necyomantia* occurs when the ludic Cynic preacher, Menippus, finds Tiresias in Hades and poses to him the question which provoked his Homeric quest: what is the best way of life (ποῖόν τινα ἡγείται τὸν ἀριστον βίον, 21)? The first part of the Theban's response is clear. He praises the life of 'the ordinary guy'¹ (ὁ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἀριστος βίος . . . 21) and urges the Cynic to ignore the philosophers with their metaphysical speculations and instead to pursue one end alone (τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἅπαντος θηράση, 21.3–4). It is this end, the kernel of Tiresias' wisdom, which has not been successfully construed by commentators. Tiresias' advice is: ὅπως τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέμενος παραδράμης γελῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ μηδὲν ἐσπουδακῶς (21.4–5). The Theban's recommendation to Menippus has been described variously as an example of Lucian's 'nihilism'² or 'conventional Cynic diatribe'.³ It is neither. It has no parallel in Cynic teachings as far as I know, but it is not unprecedented. In the new OCT editions M. D. MacLeod carefully notes the many reworkings of Homer and other classical and archaic poets in Lucian but does not indicate that Tiresias' advice recalls both the thought and wording of a famous line of Simonides quoted as a χρεια by Theon: παύσειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ περὶ μηδὲν ἀπλῶς σπουδάσειν.⁴

¹ Cf. Plato, *Rep.* x 620c.

² C. A. van Rooy, *Studies in classical satire and related literary theory* (Leiden 1965) 111; cf. J. Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker* (Berlin 1879) 44.

³ J. J. Winkler, *Auctor et actor: a narratological reading of Apuleius' 'Golden Ass'* (Berkeley 1985) 271.

⁴ This passage (*Rhet. Gr.* i 215 Walz) is accepted as a fragment by Bergk (*Fr.* 192: *PLG* iii 522) and Page (*Fr.* 646: *PMG* 320), though it does not scan properly. It is considered an allusion to Simonides by F. W. Householder Jr., *Literary quotation and allusion in Lucian* (New York 1941) 37. An attribution to Simonides would seem equally possible (cf. n. 5). J. Bompaigne, *Lucien écrivain: Imitation et création* (Paris 1958) does not mention this passage in his discussion of χρεια

⁴ Also in *JHS* cvii (1987) W. R. Connor takes up this point (pp. 40–50). He cannot see Peisistratos as presenting himself as other than a mortal, not as Herakles, though under the patronage of Athena. That he did not present himself as Herakles seems to me very likely. I doubt whether he wore a lionskin but am equally certain that Herodotus' failure to mention one does not mean that he did not, unless we believe only what survives in written sources, and hold that what was not written never happened. Connor's insistence on the formal aspects of the procession as described is important and not at variance with my views, though to turn an Athena *parabates* into an *apobates* is too much.

⁵ For Moon's remarks on this subject see *Ancient Greek art and iconography* (ed. W. Moon; Madison 1983) 96–118. He is disturbed that an 'artist [vase-painter] and clientèle were aware of and concerned about the inner workings of Athenian urban society' (p. 97). But they were Athenian urban society and unlikely to be unaware. His other arguments exclude consideration of the more important issues tackled by Cook and he concentrates on one artist (the Priam Painter) whose originality he severely underestimates. I shall revert to this painter's record elsewhere.

⁶ He also deals properly and summarily with some other objections (his n. 3): Bazant underestimates how Greeks used myth (here 'symbolism' is quite the wrong word); his essay in his *Studies of the use and decoration of Athenian vases* (Prague 1981) 23–38 is important, but he dwells on the period of popularity for Herakles (and others) in Athens rather than the exceptional character of the Athenian scenes, which I allude to above.

⁷ I tried to express these reservations in *Ancient Greek and related pottery* (ed. H. A. G. Brijder; Amsterdam 1984) 240–1.

Whether Simonides' line is the model for Lucian's, as I suspect, or merely offers a parallel that would have been widely known from the rhetorical handbooks, the similarity is suggestive and clearly significant for interpreting the sense of Tiresias' words and hence for the work as a whole. First, a thought usually taken as some anaemic form of Cynicism turns out to be hoary with age, antedating the movement by centuries, and preserved by the rhetoricians as a *χρέια*, a form conventionally used for the sayings of wise men (cf. Theon, *Rhet. Gr.* i 148 Walz). Lucian's technique here is highly characteristic. He gives Tiresias a line with archaic precedent but one suggesting a point of view comically unsuitable to the traditional representation of the Theban prophet in epic and tragic poetry.⁵ (Theon, for example, thinks Simonides is giving bad advice: βλαβερῶς παραινέϊ.) Most importantly, the advice is clearly neither 'nihilistic' nor 'conventionally Cynic' but as highly traditional as its setting in Hades and yet cleverly adapted to this particular thematic context. Menippus' tour of Hades has shown him that the varied roles men play on earth are as arbitrary, ephemeral and ultimately inconsequential as a theatrical spectacle (16). In Hades the powerful suffer indignities, while impoverished philosophers like Socrates and Diogenes converse and laugh (17–18). In short, what is taken most seriously on earth, wealth and power, is seen from Hades to be an illusion of perspective. Tiresias' advice—an oblique commendation of Lucian's own seriocomic stance⁶—reflects this ironic perspective on human endeavor,⁷ applies it to the philosophers' own exertions at metaphysical theory, and draws the appropriate

and παροιμίαι in Lucian (297–8, 405–434, 443–68; cf. 369 n. 2). Cf. also R. F. Hock and E. N. O'Neil, *The chreia in ancient rhetoric i: the 'progymnasmata'* (Atlanta, Ga. 1986) 336. For the first part of Tiresias' advice (τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέμενος), cf. Cratinus fr. 184, PCG iv 216.

⁵ It would be all the more characteristic of Lucian's method of drawing on ancient traditions if his Tiresias should give advice covertly recalling one of the most satirically-minded of the archaic poets, that is, if the line belongs to Semonides of Amorgos (almost universally spelled Simonides before Choeroboscos) rather than Simonides. Lucian refers approvingly to Semonides along with Hipponax at *Pseudol.* 2 while likening himself to Archilochus. The only other appearance in Lucian of either poet is a quotation from Simonides, *Pro Im.* 19. It is impossible to rule out either poet as the source of the *χρέια* on the basis of its content, especially since we do not know its original context; in any event, the lack of any discernible metrical pattern suggests that Theon's 'quotation' involves paraphrase.

⁶ Cf. R. B. Branham, *CA* iii 2 (1984) 143–63; *TAPA* cxv (1985) 237–43. I refer to the σπουδογέλοιος here not to 'explain' the passage by reference to another puzzle but to suggest that Tiresias' advice may in part be a Lucianic gloss on the idea of the seriocomic. Menippus is virtually the only author actually called σπουδογέλοιος in antiquity (Strabo xvi 2.29 Kramer ed.).

⁷ While the pairing of the serious with the comic or playful strikes a familiar note (cf. *Ar. Ran.* 389–93), the demotion of seriousness and advocacy of laughter or play is unusual in extant Greek literature. This emphasis differs, for example, from that of a famous passage in Plato (*Lg.* 803b) which endorses a serious attitude in spite of the game-like nature of life when viewed from the perspective of the gods (on παίξιον, see W. Burkert, *Eranois Jb* li [1982] 335–51). The closest parallel I know (other than Theon's *khreia*) occurs in a sympotic fragment celebrating σκώπτειν and γέλωτος against σπουδῆς as forming the ἀρετὴ of the occasion (*Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, ed. M. L. West, ii [Oxford 1972] *Adesp. Eleg. fr.* 27). It may be that part of the effect of Lucian's joke depends on making Tiresias the spokesman for a recognizably sympotic theme, thus violating our generic expectations for the grave wisdom the prophet would impart in Hades.

moral, one much like that which, in some context unfortunately lost to us, a classical poet had drawn some six centuries earlier: παραδράμης γελῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ μηδὲν ἐσπουδακῶς. The unexpected way in which elements of varied traditions are here combined—the Theban prophet covertly echoing the words of a lyric poet to a puzzled Cynic—is what makes the passage distinctively Lucianic.⁸

R. B. BRANHAM

The Center for Hellenic Studies
3100 Whitehaven Street
Washington, D.C. 20008

⁸ I wish to thank the referee and Tony Edwards for their helpful comments on this note.

Athenian Oligarchs: The Numbers Game

By the last quarter of the fifth century it was generally agreed that there were three basic forms of government: monarchy, democracy and oligarchy, and this basic division continued to the end of the classical period.¹ For the Athenians, this choice was for practical purposes reduced to one between democracy and oligarchy: kings might appear on the tragic stage, but in contemporary Athens sole rule was synonymous with tyranny, a form of government which had been beyond the pale since the expulsion of the Peisistratids. Indeed, in the late fifth century it was the object of a public hysteria which affords Aristophanes much scope for satire, particularly in Bdelycleon's speech in *Vesp.* 488 f., and in the offer of a reward ἦν τε τῶν τυράννων τίς τινα τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀποκτείνει (*Av.* 1074–5; cf. also *Lys.* 619, 630 f.).

Furthermore, from the late fifth century Athenian democrats tended to associate oligarchy with tyranny. Thucydides reports the allegation that the mutilation of the Herms was aimed ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῆ καὶ τυραννικῆ (vi 60.1 cf. 61.1); likewise after the restoration of democracy in 410 the decree of Demophantus (*And.* i 97) calls for an oath to resist both ἐάν τις ἄρξῃ τιν' ἀρχὴν καταλελυμένης τῆς δημοκρατίας and ἐάν τις τυραννεῖν ἐπαναστῆ ἢ τὸν τύραννον συγκαταστήσῃ.² Similarly in the early fourth century the orators refer to the Four Hundred and the Thirty as tyrants (*And.* i 75, *Isoc.* viii 123 cf. *X. HG* ii 4.1) or in the imagery of freedom and slavery traditionally attached to tyrants, which is already to be found in *And.* ii 27 (probably of 409/8) used of the Four Hundred.³ A memory of the

¹ First in Pi. *P.2.* 86–8, dated between 475 and 468; cf. *Hdt.* iii 80–2, *Pl. R.* 338d8, *Plt.* 291cd, 301c, *Isoc.* xii 132, *D.* xxiii 66 (n.b. τύραννος), *Aeschin.* i 4, *Arist. Pol.* 1279a25. The parallel degenerate forms do not appear until the early fourth century (*X. Mem.* iv 6.12, *Pl. Plt.* 291d–2a, *R.* 543 f.), perhaps inspired by the successive downfalls of the radical democracy and a close oligarchy at the end of the preceding century.

² N.B. the assimilation of ξυνωμοσία (implying oligarchy) to tyranny in *Ar. Vesp.* (345, 483, 488, 507 f. cf. 417). If *Thesmophoriazusaie* belongs to the Dionysia of 411 (for which see *HCT* v 187–93) the references to tyranny (338, 1143–4) on the eve of an oligarchic revolution are particularly striking.

³ Of the Thirty: *Lys.* ii 61–2, 64, xii 39, 73, 92, 94, 97, xiii 17, xiv 34, xviii 5, 24, 27, xxviii 13, xxxi 26, 31, 32, *Isoc.* xvi 37. Of the Four Hundred: *Lys.* xii 67. Of both revolutions: *Lys.* xii 78, *Isoc.* xx 10. For the usage cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 15.2. Oligarchs naturally tried to assimilate themselves to the constitutional forms of government: in *Thuc.* iii 62.3 the Thebans implicitly align themselves with democracy against δυναστεία, which is ἐγγυτάτω . . . τυράννου.